Notes

• [1]
  The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) opposed the Agreement for a number of reasons including the early release of paramilitary prisoners and the IRA’s reluctance to decommission their weapons. The Good Friday Agreement was approved in a referendum by 71,1% of the Northern Irish electorate.
• [2]
  The Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations, 2, Constitutional Issues, art. 1 (iii). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf.
• [3]
  S. Mallon, A shared home place, Lilliput press, Dublin, 2018 ; M.-C. Considère-Charon, « A shared home place », Revue des livres, Politique étrangère, 2019, n° 4.
• [4]
  Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations, Strand one, Democratic institutions in Northern Ireland, 1-13. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf.
• [5]
  Ibid., Strand two, North-South Ministerial Council, 1-19.
• [6]
  Ibid., Strand Three, British-Irish Council 1-12, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 1-9.
• [7]
  The idea that the Good Friday Agreement and the 1998 Northern Ireland Act were a constitution for Northern Ireland was put forward by a majority of Lords in the case Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 2002, Judgments – Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 2002, 25. https://publicationsparliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd020725/robin-2.htm, accessed 15 July 2020. Also G. Anthony, « The Quarter Plus Two : Judicial Review in Northern Ireland », in TT Arvind, R. Kirkham, D. Mac Síthigh (eds.), Executive Decision-Making and the Courts : Revisiting the Origins of Modern Judicial Review, Gorodnsville, Bloomsbury, 2021.
• [8]
  C. Mc Crudden, « The Good Friday Agreement, Brexit, and Rights », British Academy, oct. 2017. https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/164/2017-10-30_Good_Friday_Agreement.pdf, accessed 15 July 2020.
• [9]
  The annual conflict-related death toll, which peaked at 480 in 1972, has dropped to the single digits in recent years.
• [10]
  The Agreement, ibid., Security 1,2.
• [11]
  The connection that had been made in the framework documents of 1995 between crossborder cooperation and European integration had generated a hostile reaction from the Unionist parties. The link with the European Union was therefore supposedly avoided not to antagonize them.
• [12]
  There is no doubt that this paragraph assumes that the United Kingdom and Ireland will remain members of the European Union. But there is no indication that the implementation of EU policies would stop if the United Kingdom were to leave the European Union.
• [13]
  Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations, Strand two, the Council, 5, (ii).
• [14]
  Strand two contains an annex which lists the various areas of cooperation between the two jurisdictions, Strand two, Areas for North-South cooperation, 1-12.
• [15]
  J. Major, « “Britain Stronger in Europe” campaign event », Ulster University Magee campus, Derry-Londonderry, 9 June 2016. https://www.ulster.ac.uk/news/2016/june/britain-stronger-ineurope-campaign, accessed 25 Aug. 2020.
• [16]
  The choice of a consociational solution to the ethno-political conflict in Northern Ireland was made ahead of the 1998 Agreement. Thirteen years before the Belfast Agreement was signed, the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement initiated the consociational line which was followed and developed later.
• [17]
  The application of the consociational system relies on four major principles : A wide government coalition, which allows representative leaders to settle disputes between the divided segments of society, segmental autonomy which allows sub groups to claim their rights in terms of education, culture and status, proportional representation which is meant to ensure a fair representation of all socio-ethnic groups and a veto right for minorities which is an extra guarantee for justice and equality for all societal segments. A. Lijphart, « Consociational Democracy », World Politics 21, Jan. 1969, n° 2, pp. 207-225. https://www.jstor.org/stable/i308670https://www.jstor.org/stable/i308670, accessed 8 July 2020.
• [18]
  The « d’Hondt method » is a sophisticated mathematical formula used in proportional representation systems. It is supposed to be effective in facilitating majority formation and thus in securing parliamentary operability. Such proportional distribution presumably prevents domination of parliamentary political life by only one or two large political groups, Some people argue however that this limits the impact of the election results on the political direction of decision making within Parliament and call for a « winner-takes-all » approach instead.
• [19]
  Since political representation is rooted in the defence of communal interests, parties do not compete to become a majority party, but simply to obtain a majority of votes within their own communal bloc. The more extreme parties, Sinn Fein and the D.U.P., have been the two majority parties since 2007, and replaced their more moderate intra-ethnic rivals, the Ulster Unionist party (UUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP).
• [20]
  The long period of suspension from Oct. 2002 to March 2007 was only lifted through an additional agreement, the St Andrews Agreement of October 2006. In signing up to this 2006 Agreement, the DUP moved from being an anti-Agreement party to holding the seat of First Minister in the reestablished Northern Ireland Executive. The DUP was also key to the Stormont House Agreement (23 Dec. 2014) and the Fresh Start Agreement (17 Nov. 2015).
• [21]
  « […] It is accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional arrangements – an Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to British Acts of Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland – are interlocking and interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South Council are so closely inter-related that the success of each depends on that of the other », The Belfast Agreement, Declaration of support, 5.
• [22]
  Independent Review of Integrated Education, Department of Education Northern Ireland, Integrated schools, 2 March 2017. https://www.education-ni.gov.uk/articles/independent-reviewintegrated-education, accessed 27 June 2020.
• [23]
  Peace walls are emblematic of the segregation between predominantly nationalist and republican areas and predominantly unionist and loyalist neighbourhoods in the main cities of Ulster. They were meant to reduce inter-communal violence. Some of them have a gate and allow passage during the day but are locked at night.
• [24]
  Party leaders and law makers are only accountable to their respective community, and therefore will defend their separate communal interests rather than the common good. The formation of the Executive is not based on a shared coalition governmental programme but merely on a distribution of ministerial portfolios according to a purely arithmetic formula.
• [25]
  However the results of the 2019 General election reveal that both the DUP and Sinn Fein saw their share of the vote drop significantly while the cross-community Alliance party won one seat and the Social Democratic and Labour party won two seats.
• [26]
  Briefing Paper for the eighth meeting of the North/South Inter-Parliamentary Association, Paper 1 : « Impact of Brexit on Cross-Border Activity », 18 Nov. 2016. http://crossborder.ie/site2015/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Impact-of-Brexit-on-CrossBorderActivity.pdf, accessed 30 Aug. 2020.
• [27]
  Secretary of State Brokenshire, extracts from speech at Oxford University, 21 Sept. 2016 : https://www.niconservatives.com/news/secretary-state-northern-ireland-Brexit, accessed 10 Aug. 2020.
• [28]
  High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, Queen’s bench division, Ref.MAG176, 28/10/2016. At the time these two applications were brought, similar challenges had already been brought to the courts of England and Wales. The English proceedings, R (Miller) and others v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, also concerned the means by which art. 50 TEU could be triggered and the issue of the use of prerogative executive power by statute. https://brexit.hypotheses.org/files/2017/01/McCord.pdf, accessed 20 Aug. 2020.
• [29]
  Treaty of Lisbon, Title VI, final provisions, art. 50.
• [30]
  Their view was that the Good Friday Agreement created « a legitimate expectation of no change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional status without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland ». The UK Government’s position was there would be no « special status » for Northern Ireland and that art. 50 notification would be provided to the effect that the entirety of the United Kingdom including Northern Ireland and Scotland – which had also voted to remain – intended to leave the EU.
• [31]
  Since 1999 the UK government has followed a convention, known as the Sewel Convention, which states that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the devolved legislatures. It can be therefore argued that it has been broken by Brexit, with the UK proceeding with the Withdrawal Agreement Bill despite the fact that three out of the four constituent parts of the UK vigorously expressed their objections. J. Sargeant, « The Sewel Convention has been broken by Brexit-reform is now urgent », Institute for Government, 21 Jan. 2020, instituteforgoverment.org.uk, accessed 10 July 2020.
• [32]
  McCord expressed concerns that leaving the EU would have a « catastrophic effect » for the peace process and argued that Brexit could endanger EU funding that was currently assisting victims of The Troubles.
• [33]
  The Committee on the Administration of Justice and the Human Rights Consortium.
• [34]
  Ahead of the EU referendum, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee report had concluded that there were major concerns in respect of the impact of Brexit, in Northern Ireland in the fields of trade and commerce, agriculture and the border, and cross-border issues. Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Northern Ireland and the EU Referendum (First Report of Session 2016-17, HC 48, 25 May 2016).
• [35]
  The argument before the court was not about the principle of law involved but about how the principle is to operate in a particular case.
• [36]
  During the Court proceedings it was argued that the 2013 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Westminster and the devolved administrations set out « the principles that will underlie relations » between the UK Government at Westminster and the Northern Ireland administration. There was an express commitment in the MOU on the part of the UK Government that… « the UK Government will proceed in accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature ». C. McCrudden, D. Halberstam, « Miller and Northern Ireland, A critical constitutional response », SSRN, 1 Nov. 2017. Accessed 20 June 2020.
• [37]
  C. McCrudden, D. Halberstam, « Miller and Northern Ireland : a critical constitutional response », The UK Supreme Court Yearbook, Vol. 8, Queen’s University, Dec. 2017. https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/miller-and-northern-ireland-a-critical-constitutional-response, accessed 3 July 2020.
• [38]
  The Agreement, Constitutional issues, art. 1, (iii).
• [39]
  UK Supreme Court, Case of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland, 25 Nov. 2016, UKSC 2016/0201, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/attorney-general-for-northern-ireland.pdf. The Supreme Court gave the same judgement in the case of Miller and Dos Santos v. Secretary of State.
• [40]
  The other issues were the financial settlement and the problem of the expats (European citizens in the UK, and British citizens in European member states).
• [41]
  The Agreement, Security, 1&2.
• [42]
  A. Pollak, « Cross-border Cooperation as Part of the Irish Peace Process : Opportunities, Impacts and challenges », Centre for Cross Border Studies, Northern Ireland, 2011, accessed 21 Aug. 2020.
• [43]
  K. Hayward, E. Magennis, « The Business of Building Peace : Private Sector Cooperation across the Irish Border », Irish Political Studies 29(1), Feb. 2014, accessed 20 Aug. 2020.
• [44]
  The Agreement, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, 6 : « Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also will address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation between the two Governments on the all-island or cross-border aspects of these matters ».
• [45]
  Much of the information sharing and other practical cooperation between the PSNI and Garda Síochána is currently done through Europol and other EU regulatory structures.
• [46]
  There was huge ideological resistance to cross border cooperation from both unionists and nationalists in the early stages. According to a number of unionists cross border reconciliation was « a united Ireland by the back door » while some northern nationalists were reluctant to re-establish links with their southern counterparts who they believed had abandoned them.
• [47]
  According to the UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups : the Continuity IRA (CIRA) ; Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH) ; Arm na Poblachta (ANP), and the New IRA (which reportedly was formed in 2012 and brought together the Real IRA, the Republican Action Against Drugs, or RAAD, and a number of independent republicans). These groups have sought to target police officers, prison officers, and other members of the security services in particular. The New IRA claimed responsibility for killing journalist Lyra McKee in April 2019.
• [48]
  Independent reporting commission, second report, 4 Nov. 2019. https://www.ircommission.org/sites/irc/files/media-files/IRC%20%202nd%20Report%202019_0.pdf, accessed 15 July 2020.
• [49]
  Poverty and unemployment tend to be high among the urban working class and even though the major paramilitary groups have disbanded many young men are vulnerable to radicalisation.
• [50]
  When she met with Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny on 31 Jan. 2017 in Dublin Theresa May declared « there will be no return to the borders of the past » and added that she remained committed to the Good Friday Agreement drawn up as part of the Northern Ireland peace process. Enda Kenny confirmed that he had agreed with May to keep the Irish border open and fluid and warned that any post-Brexit hard border would have « very negative consequences » for peace and stability in Ireland.
• [51]
  The British claim that a « frictionless » Irish border could be achieved through the smart use of technological solutions, was derided by the Institut Jacques Delors and referred to as « the fiction of a frictionless border » or magical thinking. A. Gouez, « Ireland on the rocky road to Brexit », Jacques Delors Institute, 30 Nov. 2017.
• [52]
  On 26 June 2017, after the snap election resulted in a hung parliament, the Confidence and Supply Agreement was signed between the Democratic Unionist Party and the minority Conservative government led by Theresa May. Arlene Foster, leader of the DUP, insisted that « the entirety of the UK should be leaving the single market and the customs union » and threatened to withdraw her parliamentary support on which May’s government relied if Northern Ireland was treated differently to the UK after Brexit.
• [53]
  A. Ferguson, « Arlene Foster says North must leave EU on same terms as rest of Britain », Irish Times, 4 Dec. 2017.
• [54]
  Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union, Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, art. 1, 4, p. 306.
• [55]
  Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, art. 6, § 1.
• [56]
  Ibid., art. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.
• [57]
  The backstop triggered further controversy among Conservative MPs after the Attorney General’s legal advice was known. In a six-page document, released on 5 Dec. 2018, Attorney General Geoffrey Cox declared that he could not support the agreement since he believed that the United Kingdom would be entrapped indefinitely in the backstop that is the customs union with the EU. Exiting the EU : Publication of Legal Advice, to Cabinet on the Withdrawal Agreement and the Protocol on Ireland/ Northern Ireland, 5 Dec. 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/exiting-the-eu-publication-of-legal-advice, accessed 10 July 2020.
• [58]
  In his Nobel lecture David Trimble had claimed that if Northern Ireland could change from being, « a cold house for Catholics », maybe the nationalist community would become less resistant to it remaining part of the United Kingdom. D. Trimble, « Nobel lecture », Oslo, 10 Dec. 1998. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1998/trimble/lecture/
• [59]
  D. Trimble, « The Backstop Would Wreck the Good Friday Agreement », Policy Exchange, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-Backstop-would-Wreck-the-Good-Friday-Agreement.pdf, accessed 10 July 2020.
• [60]
  There had also been one challenge in the courts of England and Wales brought by campaigner Gina Miller who had previously mounted a successful legal challenge to former Prime Minister Theresa May’s government over its authority to leave the EU without a vote in Parliament, and another one at the Edinburgh Court of Session brought by SNP MP Joanna Cherry and Liberal Democrat Jo Swinson. The Scottish judge, Lord Doherty rejected the case on 4 Sept. 2019 declaring that there had been no contravention of the law by the UK government and the PM had not exceeded is powers. The issue was for politicians and voters to judge, and not the courts. The Miller case was also rejected on 6 September by Chief Justice Lord Burnett declaring that the question of suspension was « inherently and fundamentally » political and not a matter for the courts.
• [61]
  In a no-deal scenario, the UK would immediately leave the European Union (EU) with no agreement about the « divorce » process. It would mean leaving the single market and customs union – arrangements designed to help trade between EU members by eliminating checks and tariffs (taxes on imports). It also meant immediately leaving key European institutions such as the European Court of Justice and Europol, its law enforcement body as well as dozens of EU bodies that govern rules on everything from medicines to trade marks.
• [62]
  It was reported that McCord’s lawyers had written to the Prime Minister to seek assurances before initiating the judicial review proceedings.
• [63]
  Supreme Court Judgement, R (on the application of Miller (Appellant) v. The Prime Minister (Respondent), [2019] UKSC 41 (https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2019-0192-judgment.pdf,, accessed 11 July 2020).
• [64]
  Revised Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, Preamble, 17 Oct. 2019, ec.europa.eu.
• [65]
  Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2019/C 384 I/01), Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, art. 5, Customs, movements of goods : No customs duties shall be payable for a good brought into Northern Ireland from another part of the United Kingdom by direct transport, notwithstanding paragraph 3, unless that good is at risk of subsequently being moved into the Union, whether by itself or forming part of another good following processing
• [66]
  The negotiations on the future trade relation between the United Kingdom and the European Union have hardly shown any progress amid concerns that low standard meat products imported from the United States might circulate on the British market. The EU which applies the precautionary principle has a very different view on food safety to the US and considers it essential to prevent poor quality products, such as chlorinated chicken or hormone-treated beef, from finding their way into the single market via Northern Ireland. The EU insists that Britain must commit to maintaining EU standards, in such areas as state aid, workers’ rights or environmental regulations, in order to ensure a « level playing field ».
• [67]
  Art. 18, Democratic consent in Northern Ireland.
• [68]
  In May’s deal British proposals would have given the DUP a veto in any decision of the Northern Assembly to opt out of the new regime. Ibid., art.18, 6.
• [69]
  Despite the Prime Minister’s denial, on 11 Feb. 2020, Michael Gove, the Cabinet Secretary, announced that there would be declarations on goods moving from Great Britain to NI to provide rigorous checks on agrifood and live animals. According to Michael Gove, the « implementation of the protocol will not involve new customs infrastructure », it would involve « some expansion of existing infrastructure ».
• [70]
  Revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, art. 15 § 2, The working group shall be composed of representatives of the Union and the United Kingdom and shall carry out its functions under the supervision of the Specialised Committee to which it shall report.
• [71]
  Revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, art. 2 § 2, The United Kingdom shall continue to facilitate the related work of the institutions and bodies set up pursuant to the 1998 Agreement, including the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and the Joint Committee of representatives of the Human Rights Commissions of Northern Ireland and Ireland, in upholding human rights and equality standards. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/revised_withdrawal_agreement_including_protocol_on_ireland_and_nothern_ireland.pdf.
• [72]
  Art. 12 § 2, Without prejudice to § 4 of this art., Union representatives shall have the right to be present during any activities of the authorities of the United Kingdom related to the implementation and application of provisions of Union law made applicable by this Protocol, as well as activities related to the implementation and application of art. 5, and the United Kingdom shall provide, upon request, all relevant information relating to such activities. The United Kingdom shall facilitate such presence of Union representatives and shall provide them with the information requested. Where the Union representative requests the authorities of the United Kingdom to carry out control measures in individual cases for duly stated reasons, the authorities of the United Kingdom shall carry out those control measures. The working group shall be composed of representatives of the Union and the United Kingdom and shall carry out its functions under the supervision of the Specialised Committee to which it shall report.
• [73]
  Good Friday Agreement, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights. Against the background of the precedent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular : the right of free political thought ; the right to freedom and expression of religion ; the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations ; the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means ; the right to freely choose one’s place of residence ; the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity ; the right to freedom from sectarian harassment ; and the right of women to full and equal political participation.
• [74]
  Guiding principles transmitted to EU27 for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Commission to EU27, TF50 (2017) 15, 6 Sept. 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/guiding-principles-dialogue-ei-ni_en.pdf, accessed 10 Aug. 2020. Good Friday Agreement and Peace Process (4).
• [75]
  British-Irish Agreement : Annex 1 « The Agreement Reached on the Multi-Party Talks » : Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity.
• [76]
  The principle of the supremacy of EU law signifies that domestic courts in both Ireland and Northern Ireland must disapply primary legislation, or a rule of the common law, or strike down secondary legislation, if the domestic law is in breach of EU law.
• [77]
  Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, Part three, Art. 4, Non regression of labour and social standards, 25 nov. 2018. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759019/25_November_Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf
• [78]
  Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, Art. 3, Common Travel Area, 17 oct. 2019.
• [79]
  Political Declaration, XIV. 77, Level playing field for open and fair competition, TF50 (2019) 65-Commission to EU 27. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/revised_political_declaration.pdf.
• [80]
  The government promised to protect and enhance these rights in a separate employment bill. « Government to enshrine workers’ rights pledge in new bill, Number 10 confirms », PoliticsHome, 4 Dec. 2019.
• [81]
  The Common Travel Area consists of an arrangement dating back to 1922 which is not contained in any legislation. Apart from the basic right for citizens in Ireland and the UK to travel freely between both countries, it includes the right to live, to work and study within the CTA. It also provides a number of associated rights and privileges such as access to social benefits, to healthcare and to social housing aids as well as the right to vote in certain elections.
• [82]
  J. Tonge, Brexit : devolution, House of Lords European Union Committee, 19 July 2017. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/9/906.htm, accessed 2 Sept. 2020.
• [83]
  J. McCormack, « Brexit and Identity : A delicate issue », BBC News, 23 Feb. 2019.
• [84]
  A significant amount of direct funding has been at stake but despite Brexit, the current funding program is set to last through the end of 2021, with a budget of 270 million euros.
• [85]
  Prime Minister’s questions, Westminster Parliament, 9 Sept. 2020.
• [86]
  « The Union and the United Kingdom shall, in full mutual respect and good faith, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Agreement. They shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular to ensure fulfilment of the obligations which flow from this Agreement and shall refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement », Withdrawal Agreement, art. 5, Good faith. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?qid=1580206007232&uri=CELEX%3A12019W/TXT%2802%29, accessed 5 Sept. 2020.
• [87]
  Under art. 5, 2 of the Protocol : « Before the end of the transition period, the Joint Committee shall by decision establish the criteria for considering that a good brought into Northern Ireland from outside the Union is not at risk of subsequently being moved into the Union ».
• [88]
  After the Prime Minister repeated that there was « no question of there being checks » on the movement of goods between Northern Ireland and Great-Britain, the government set out its approach to the protocol on 20 May 2020, acknowledging that that there would be checks on certain types of goods and additional processes entering Northern Ireland from Great-Britain.
• [89]
  United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, Part 5, Northern Ireland Protocol, Unfettered access to UK internal market for Northern Ireland goods 41(1). https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-01/0177/20177.pdf, accessed 17 Sept. 2020.
• [90]
  Ibid., s 42, Power to disapply or modify export declarations and other exit procedures (1) : « A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make provision about the application of exit procedures to goods, or a description of goods, when moving from Northern Ireland to Great Britain ».
• [91]
  Ibid., Northern Ireland Protocol, State aid, article 10, 1.
• [92]
  Ibid., Annex 6, Procedures referred to in art. 10 (2).
• [93]
  United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, Regulations about art. 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol, Part 5, s. 43,1.
• [94]
  Ibid., Northern Ireland Protocol, Regulations about art. 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol s. 43, 3 d.
• [95]
  « Brandon Lewis admits the government plans to break international law », New Statesman, 9 Sept. 2020.
• [96]
  In her response to the Irish Times at a news conference in the US Capitol, Nancy Pelosi declared : « Don’t mess with the Good Friday accords. This is something as Americans we ‘re very proud of our participation in », Irish Times, 10 Sept. 2020.
• [97]
  Prime Minister’s statement on protecting the Union, Westminster Parliament, 14 Sept. 2020, https://www.conservatives.com/news/uk-internal-market-bill-speech-in-full, accessed 10 Sept. 2020.
• [98]
  J. Todd, « The vulnerability of the Northern Ireland settlement, British-Irish relations, Political crisis and Brexit », Études irlandaises 40(2), 2015. https://journals.openedition.org/etudesirlandaises/4734, accessed 20 Aug. 2020.
• [99]
  It has also deeply damaged the relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, which had considerably improved in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement.